95 Theses, moving onward from
Heidegger
- Heidegger’s
method in SZ can best be understood, in the final account (and this
means in the theory of temporality) as one that is centered on genesis,
even a geneticism.
- As a
philosophy of genesis it is not in any obvious way a Kantianism, or a
transcendental philosophy (or a structuralism).
- As a
philosophy of temporality, SZ is a philosophy whose basic concept
is genesis and this is how it understands phenomenality.
- At the
heart of genesis (i.e. within temporality) SZ stumbles upon a
peculiar, abstract form of non-experiential spatiality.
- Lemma:
If we can characterize phenomenology, or the philosophy of genesis as a
philosophy of temporality, then we can characterize Structuralism
(narrowly defined to philosophy of language – e.g. Saussure, Benveniste,
Ducrot) as a philosophy of spatiality.
- The SZ-attempt
at a temporality-centered philosophy, a philosophy of generation,
discovers –unwittingly – a spatial reference which turns it into a higher
structuralism.
- In the
architecture of SZ, temporality properly understood, i.e. out of
itself and not via detour, grounds and unifies Care.
- The
character of this founding and unifying is under-appreciated if not
misunderstood.
- The
discourse thus takes a strong turn towards a variant of a transcendental
argument.
- However,
it is transcendental in its discursive structure only.
- It
is not a transcendental philosophy in the sense of the Copernican
Revolution (i.e. Subject foundation).
- We
can call this discursive resemblance with transcendental conditions a
structuralism.
- Heidegger’s
auto-critique expressed in post-SZ writings concerns, on the one
hand, the terminology of ‘conditions of possibility,’ and on the other,
the a priori presentation of ‘difference.’ This is an indication of
the critique of the earlier transcendental structuralist position from the
standpoint of a philosophy of genesis.
- While
it may be possible to find this processual understanding of difference
and possibility already supplied in SZ, this depends on a retroactive
reading of Heidegger’s work.
- It
can be said that SZ understood as a structuralist (transcendental)
project subsequently gets transformed into a geneticism viz. the ‘history
of being’ and the dynamicization of possibility.
- Independently
of theses 1-4, we can see that the SZ conception of temporality,
read on its own terms, is a hierarchical typology of temporalities.
- Insisting
now on the plural in ‘temporalities,’ SZ is radically different
from the tradition of ‘Manichean’ theories of time opposing two types.
(Many historical instances here).
- The
hierarchisation also comports a hierarchisation of types of ‘presence’
and this is the first instance of a ‘critique of the metaphysics
of presence.’ (Many subsequent historically tributary references here).
- Though
the hierarchical typology is presented (pros hemas) in SZ
clearly by moving from Dasein to temporality, it is equally
clear that there is a strong equivalence (en auto) between these
two notions and not a necessary dependence.
- Wherefrom
it follows that the hierarchy can be understood as organized according to
criteria immanent to temporality. (Many subsequent historical
instances of misunderstanding here)
- Lyotard’s
hypothesis of an open-ended list of temporalisations can then be
confronted here.
- The
strong equivalence between Dasein and temporality means that the latter is
not founded on the former; indeed temporality (which is different from
‘time,’ and grounds ‘time’) has no other foundation than itself.
- Temporality,
on our reading of SZ, has no condition heterogeneous to itself.
But, again, ‘time’ is based on something other than ‘time.’
- From
which it follows that the imputation of a ‘temporal idealism’ is
mistaken.
- The
alternative to the reading above is the classical derivational reading of temporality
which becomes unsustainable viz. teleology:
- On
the classical derivational account, temporality is derived from and is
dependent upon the structure of Care. Care, as presented in the
analytic of Dasein is importantly marked by the feature of worumwillen.
This latter term is Heidegger’s rendering of the Aristotelian ou eneka.
- Hence,
this reading makes, not just the human being but time itself and
temporality depend on a conception of final cause, of purposivity, of
teleology and of goal-directedness.
- Such
a classical derivational reading of temporality (like all readings of SZ
which emphasize the first half of the book at the detriment of the second
half) is guilty of a deep anthropomorphism in its ontology and
metaphysics.